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JUDGES’ ETHICAL DUTIES TO ENSURE FAIR 
TREATMENT OF INDIGENT PARTIES 
Tom Lininger* 
 
In this Essay, I will argue that the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct (“the Model Code”) should more squarely address 
the challenges faced by low-income litigants.  Amendments should make 
clear that judges have a duty to ensure the fair treatment of the indigent in 
the U.S. legal system.  I have written elsewhere about the legitimacy of 
amending ethical rules to advance specific public policy goals,1 and due to 
the page limit for authors in this Colloquium, I will not address that topic 
again here.2  I will devote the balance of my Essay to offering eight proposals 
 
*  Orlando John and Marian H. Hollis Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  I wrote 
this Essay for the Colloquium entitled The Judicial Role in Professional Regulation, hosted 
by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at 
Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful to all the Colloquium participants who 
made suggestions for the improvement of this Essay.  Leili Saber provided excellent editorial 
assistance.  I appreciate the opportunity to take part in a colloquium with scholars whose work 
I greatly admire.  The field of legal ethics owes much to the leadership of Fordham University 
School of Law’s Stein Center for Law and Ethics and to the Fordham Law Review’s recent 
symposia relating to professional responsibility. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies and Videotape:  The Surveillance and Infiltration 
of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1271–78 (2004) (arguing that it would be both 
effective and conceptually legitimate to amend the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
in order to limit prosecutors’ involvement in religious profiling during criminal 
investigations); see also Tom Lininger, Green Ethics for Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 711, 
726–33 (2018) (arguing that the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct should address 
environmental protection but noting possible objections to this approach); Tom Lininger, 
Green Ethics for Lawyers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 61, 74–75 (2016) (providing a similar analysis with 
respect to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); cf. Tom Lininger, No Privilege to 
Pollute:  Expanding the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 105 MINN. 
L. REV. 113, 139–53, 163–71 (2020) (discussing a similar analysis with respect to proposed 
revisions of privilege rules). 
 2. Except to say this:  the critique of undue specificity in ethics rules seems particularly 
inapposite for proposals that would improve treatment of the low-income population.  A vast 
number of Americans are economically vulnerable, and as the recent downturn resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, some people who usually enjoy economic security can 
abruptly find themselves among the destitute.  In criminal cases, over 80 percent of defendants 
are indigent. RONALD ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  ADJUDICATION AND RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 108 n.1 (3rd ed. 2020).  The ethical rules for lawyers and judges already address, to 
some extent, the need to protect low-income people, and the ethical rules presently accord 
even greater protection to subparts of our society that are smaller in size than the low-income 
population. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) 
(prohibiting judges from discriminating based on various attributes, including socioeconomic 
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that could help to make the judicial system more responsive to the needs of 
low-income parties.  I do not present these proposals as a comprehensive 
reform package but rather as small steps in the right direction. 
The time seems to be ripe for a reexamination of judges’ ethical duties to 
help the indigent.  Several recent ABA initiatives suggest a growing interest 
in this category of reform.  On March 24, 2020, the ABA Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal ethics 
opinion exhorting judges to consider more carefully the ability of low-
income parties to pay court fines, fees, restitution, bail, and other categories 
of debt.3  On August 4, 2020, the ABA House of Delegates approved an 
amendment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e), allowing lawyers 
to provide financial support to indigent clients under limited circumstances.4  
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense is 
celebrating its one-hundred-year anniversary in 2020 and is redoubling its 
efforts to improve the administration of justice for the benefit of low-income 
populations.5  These various developments may provide reason for optimism 
about the ABA’s receptiveness to proposals consonant with their recent work 
to ameliorate the plight of the impecunious. 
The parts that follow present draft language for proposed amendments to 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  The language of the current rules 
appears in plain roman text and the proposed additions appear in italics.  
Strikethroughs indicate deletions.  The explanations of the proposals will be 
brief due to space limitations but will offer a starting point for discussion and 
future scholarship. 
I.  GENERAL DUTY OF FAIR TREATMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF RESOURCES 
Rule 2.2 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 2.2:  Impartiality and Fairness 
A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of 
judicial office fairly and impartially., and shall ensure that court 
procedures subject to the judge’s control are fair to all parties and 
witnesses irrespective of their resources, socioeconomic status or ability to 
secure representation by counsel.6 
 
status), with id. r. 3.6 (prohibiting judges from joining groups that discriminate on certain 
grounds but omitting socioeconomic status from those grounds). 
 3. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020). 
 4. Under this amendment, a lawyer representing an indigent client either on a contingent 
fee basis or through a clinic on a pro bono basis would be able to pay for the client’s food, 
rent, transportation, medicine, and other basic living expenses.  For the amendment text, see 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNUAL MEETING 2020, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 107 (2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/08/2020-am-
resolutions/107.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK7S-6BZH]. 
 5. Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Def., A Century of SCLAID, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/about-us/sclaid-100 
[https://perma.cc/SZ7Q-7GG6] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 6. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2. 
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Rule 2.2 ranks among the most important rules in the Model Code.  
Published judicial opinions cite this rule more often than virtually any other 
in the ABA’s template or its state counterparts.7  At first blush, the generality 
of the language in Model Rule 2.2 might seem to limit its efficacy, but 
because the rest of the code has few specific provisions, Model Rule 2.2 
provides important guidance for judges in the interstices where there is no 
on-point rule. 
In its current form, Model Rule 2.2 stresses three considerations:  fealty to 
the law, impartiality, and fairness.  The imperative of following the law is 
straightforward and requires no further explanation elsewhere in the code.8  
The idea of impartiality is more challenging, but interpretation by the U.S. 
Supreme Court,9 along with detailed code provisions listing bases for 
disqualification,10 sheds light on the meaning of this concept.  Model Rule 
2.2’s use of the term “fairly,” however, raises questions that the code never 
answers.  What does fairness entail, and how can a judge assess fairness when 
it is necessary to make a close call? 
This Essay’s proposed amendment would help to clarify what fairness 
necessitates.  The amendment would focus the fairness inquiry on 
discretionary matters of procedure.11  The new rule would view fairness 
through a Rawlsian lens.12  Court proceedings should be fair to all, but when 
parties dispute the fairness of a discretionary procedure and the parties’ 
 
 7. Westlaw searches on September 5, 2020, found that published opinions cited Model 
Rule 2.2 more frequently than all but two of the rules in Canon 2.  Those two rules were 2.9 
(ex parte contacts) and 2.11 (disqualification).  No rule in Canon 3 or Canon 4 had as many 
citations in published opinions as did Model Rule 2.2.  The Westlaw searches used the 
following Boolean terms and connectors query in order to find citations to all states’ codes:  
“judicial conduct” and “rule __.” 
 8. So unremarkable is this first requirement that the ABA omitted it from the title of 
Model Rule 2.2.:  “Impartiality and Fairness.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2. 
 9. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion 
considered several possible definitions of impartiality before settling on one that he used to 
determine whether Minnesota had narrowly tailored its restrictions on judicial speech in order 
to advance a compelling state interest. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 
774–80 (2002). 
 10. Rule 2.11 of the Model Code includes very detailed tests for determining when a judge 
could have a conflict necessitating disqualification. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11.  
These tests include a bright-line rule focusing on whether any person within the third degree 
of relationship from the judge or the judge’s spouse has one of four enumerated statuses. Id. 
r. 2.11(A)(2). 
 11. The amendment insists on fairness with respect to court procedures subject to the 
judge’s control rather than fairness in uniform rules that the judge must apply or substantive 
fairness, which depends largely on statutes in both civil and criminal cases.  Proposals offered 
later in this Essay will illustrate what fairness requires in particular discretionary matters, such 
as judges’ assistance to parties representing themselves, see infra Part IV, or judges’ 
determinations of bail, see infra Part VI. 
 12. The philosopher John Rawls urged that the plight of the worst-off segment of society 
deserved greater attention than any other consideration in policymakers’ calculus. JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65 (rev. ed. 1999).  John Rawls presented what he called the 
“Difference Principle.” Id.  Any proposal that might result in unequal distribution of resources 
or benefits must be judged according to whether it would “improve[] the expectations of the 
least advantaged members of society.” Id.  Thus, the interests “of those less fortunate” have 
absolute priority in Rawlsian normative theory. Id. 
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arguments seem to be in equipoise, the need to protect the most vulnerable 
should be a tiebreaker.  Parties’ vulnerability could be due to limited 
resources, lack of economic security, or—in an increasing percentage of 
cases13—lack of legal representation.14  In assessing vulnerability, judges 
would look primarily to the parties, but the plight of witnesses also deserves 
consideration, especially that of complainants in criminal cases.15 
The amended version of Model Rule 2.2 might not have a significant effect 
on judges’ rulings in procedural or evidentiary disputes if the judges believe 
that other codes foreclose the approach urged by Model Rule 2.2.  For this 
reason, similar language should appear in the preambular provisions of 
federal and state codes in the areas of civil procedure, criminal procedure, 
and evidence.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 and its state counterparts 
should be amended to read as follows: 
Rule 1:  Scope and Purposes 
These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the 
United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.  They should be 
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding., to promote access to justice, and to ensure that court 
procedures are fair to all parties and witnesses, irrespective of their 
resources, socioeconomic status, or ability to secure representation by 
counsel.16 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 and its state counterparts should be 
amended to read as follows: 
Rule 2:  Interpretation 
 
 13. Christine E. Cerniglia, The Civil Self-Representation Crisis:  The Need for More Data 
and Less Complacency, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355, 357 (2020) (“The increasing 
number of [self-represented litigants] indicates an impending, current, or rising crisis.”). 
 14. Comment 4 to Model Rule 2.2 presently addresses judicial assistance of pro se parties:  
“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure 
pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT r. 2.2 cmt. 4.  The comment’s recognition of the pro se party’s vulnerability is 
commendable, but the comment does not eliminate the need for this Essay’s proposed 
amendment of Model Rule 2.2.  The comment is too narrow, addressing only the challenges 
faced by pro se litigants but not those faced by other low-income parties and witnesses.  The 
comment is less efficacious than an amendment to the black letter rule would be.  More 
fundamentally, the comment misconceives of the problem as one that simply relates to 
impartiality rather than fairness.  The ABA should not only indicate that impartiality can abide 
judicial assistance to pro se litigants but also that fairness requires such assistance.  For a 
relevant proposal using mandatory rather than permissive language, see infra Part IV. 
 15. I have written previously about the hardships endured by accusers during prosecutions 
of sexual assault and other violent crimes. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1353 (2005).  Such hardships can be especially onerous during cross-examination. 
See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1616–19 (2008) 
(discussing impeachment of accusers in sexual assault prosecutions who file parallel civil 
suits); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768–72 
(2005) (focusing on difficulties faced by accusers in prosecutions for domestic violence). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of 
every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness 
in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay., and to 
ensure the court procedures are fair to all parties and witnesses 
irrespective of their resources, socioeconomic status, or ability to secure 
representation by counsel.17  
Federal Rule of Evidence 102 and its state counterparts should be amended 
to read as follows: 
Rule 102:  Purpose 
These rules should be construed to serve the following purposes:  so as to 
administer every proceeding fairly, to ensure that court procedures are fair 
to all parties and witnesses, irrespective of their resources, socioeconomic 
status, or ability to secure representation by counsel; eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay,; and promote the development of evidence 
law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.18 
II.  DUTY TO LIMIT BIASED COMMENTS AND CONDUCT 
Rule 2.3 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 2.3:  Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment 
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including 
administrative duties, without bias and prejudice. 
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or 
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but 
not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, 
marital status, socioeconomic status, receipt of public assistance, 
immigration status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, 
court officials, court security officers, pretrial services officers, probation 
officers, or others any other employees, agents, or law enforcement 
personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so. 
(C) A judge shall require lawyers, parties, witnesses, and jurors in 
proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, 
or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited 
to race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, 
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, receipt of public 
assistance, immigration status, or political affiliation., against parties, 
witnesses, lawyers, or others. 
(D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or 
lawyers from making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar 
factors, when they are relevant to an a material issue in a proceeding.19 
The amendments above would expand Model Rule 2.3 by:  (1) broadening 
the rule’s substantive scope and (2) lengthening the list of people regulated 
 
 17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2. 
 18. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 19. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3. 
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by the rule.  First, the amendments would enlarge the scope of the subject 
matter that is off-limits for discussion in court.  The list of impermissible 
topics would extend to receipt of public assistance and immigration status—
two highly inflammatory matters that could give rise to prejudice in jury trials 
and could also undermine the legitimacy of court proceedings in general.20  
The amendments would delete the prepositional clause at the end of 
paragraph (C) because the biased language covered by this paragraph is 
always in effect, no matter against whom the speaker directs it.  Finally, the 
amendment to paragraph (D) would expand the coverage of the rule by 
narrowing the exception for comments “relevant to an issue” at trial.  In 
accordance with long-standing principles of evidence law, prejudicial 
evidence would only be admissible if it bears on a material issue, not simply 
any issue cited by the proponent.21 
Second, the amendments would expand the list of people subject to the 
prohibition.  The ethics rules have long recognized courts’ authority to limit 
prejudicial statements by lawyers,22 but there should be little doubt that 
courts have similar authority with respect to parties, witnesses, and jurors.23  
The regulation of pretrial services officers and probation officers is crucial 
because prejudice in those settings could cause great harm to the people 
 
 20. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017) (holding that jury 
deliberations at the end of a criminal prosecution in which one juror’s comments disparaged 
the defense witness as an illegal immigrant and alleged that Mexicans such as the defendant 
were prone to mistreating women necessitated the racial bias exception to the general rule 
against impeachment of jury verdicts); United States v. Hampton, No. 15-00302, 2017 WL 
1954369, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2017) (“Evidence that the Defendants participated in social 
welfare programs will not be admitted because it is of little, if any, probative value . . . and 
would also be highly prejudicial.”); Order No. 25700-A-1201 (Wash. Nov. 8, 2017) 
(approving a new rule of evidence forbidding reference to immigration status of party or 
witness unless relevant to a material issue).  For an insightful discussion of the harmful effect 
when judges allow for-cause strikes of prospective jurors who are experiencing economic 
hardship, see Anna Offit, Benevolent Exclusion, 96 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 401 (setting forth the principle that evidence is inadmissible unless it 
has probative value as to a material issue); id. r. 403 (establishing that evidence is subject to 
exclusion if the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its value under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 401); Francis C. Amendola et al., 23 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of the 
Accused § 1055 (2020) (pointing out that “immaterial evidence is inadmissible”). 
 22. Lawyers are officers of the court subject to judicial supervision and since 2007, Model 
Rule 2.3 has authorized judges to restrict harassing and biased speech by lawyers. See AM. 
BAR ASS’N, SIDE-BY-SIDE TEXT COMPARISON:  2007 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT WITH 
COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF 1990 CODE (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pic_migrated/new_old.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JAH6-23JT]. 
 23. Judges may control the presentation of testimony by parties and witnesses pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 and its state counterparts, and judges may exclude prejudicial 
evidence of any sort pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its state counterparts. FED. 
R. EVID. 611, 403.  Judges may take steps to limit biased comments in the jury room by 
excluding jurors who exhibit prejudice in voir dire, instructing the jury to refrain from biased 
comments, and vacating verdicts when posttrial affidavits indicate that jurors made biased 
comments in deliberations. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869–71. 
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subject to the officers’ authority.24  Prejudice among court security officers 
and other law enforcement personnel supervised by judges has become a 
more urgent concern as courthouses draw protests against systemic racism, 
and officers need guidance to balance First Amendment rights against 
security concerns.25 
One possible objection to the proposed amendments is that comments 
concerning sensitive matters are sometimes indispensable for a fair trial or 
hearing.  This circumstance, however, should be a sufficient basis on which 
to apply paragraph (D)’s exception for advocacy and testimony bearing on 
material issues.  There can be no argument that the amended Model Rule 2.3 
constrains free speech any more than the original version of this rule or the 
recently adopted provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which applies similar prohibitions directly to lawyers.26  If lawyers can put 
up with this restriction and forbear making prejudiced comments in the 
courthouse, others in the building should be able to abide by the same 
restriction. 
III.  DUTY TO PROCESS CASES EXPEDITIOUSLY 
Rule 2.5 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 2.5:  Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation 
(A) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties, competently 
and diligently. 
 
 24. COLIN DOYLE ET AL., HARVARD CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, BAIL REFORM:  A GUIDE 
FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 14–25 (2019) (warning that biases can have harmful 
effects at pretrial stages). 
 25. E.g., Eder Campuzano et al., 100 Days of Protests in Portland, OREGONIAN (Feb. 1, 
2021), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2020/09/100-days-of-protests-in-portland.html 
[https://perma.cc/LC3Q-YYRQ] (discussing the chronology of protests near courthouses and 
elsewhere in Portland, Oregon, and noting that some “heavy-handed tactics” by law 
enforcement based inside the federal courthouse may have exacerbated problems); Adam 
Taylor et al., Calm Returns to Portland as Federal Agents Withdraw, WASH. POST. (July 31, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calm-returns-to-portland-as-federal-agents-
withdraw/2020/07/31/3606b35a-d364-11ea-9038-af089b63ac21_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8M6U-JT88] (reporting that “[t]he Portland protests gained national 
attention because of the aggressive tactics” used by federal agents protecting the courthouse). 
 26. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), added in 2016, provides in pertinent part: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 . . . . 
(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law. 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  The last sentence of Model 
Rule 8.4(g) provides that “legitimate advice or advocacy” remains permissible. Id.  First 
Amendment challenges to Model Rule 8.4(g) seem unlikely to succeed. See Rebecca Aviel, 
Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment:  Distinguishing Between Discrimination and Free 
Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 74 (2018) (concluding that Model Rule 8.4(g) does not 
infringe First Amendment rights). 
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(B) A judge shall monitor and supervise cases in ways that reduce or 
eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs. 
(B) (C) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the 
administration of court business.27 
In addition, Comment 4 to Model Rule 2.5 should be amended so that it 
reads as follows: 
[4] In disposing of matters promptly and efficiently, a judge must 
demonstrate due regard for the rights of parties to be heard and to have 
issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay.  A judge should monitor 
and supervise cases in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, 
avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.  A judge should ensure the 
expeditious processing of any criminal case involving pretrial detention or 
a possible sentence of incarceration, unless the defendant seeks an 
extension of time or an extraordinary circumstance necessitates delay.  A 
judge should ensure the expeditious processing of any other case involving 
a claim of wrongful incarceration or a claim seeking government benefits, 
shelter, education, or medical care on behalf of a person who would 
otherwise be at risk of significant harm, unless the claimant seeks an 
extension of time or an extraordinary circumstance necessitates delay.28 
Currently, the Model Code’s omission of a black letter rule regarding delay 
stands in contrast with the express treatment of this issue in other codes of 
ethics for judges and lawyers.  The ABA’s original Canons of Judicial Ethics 
and its first version of the Model Code stressed that judges must perform 
judicial duties promptly.29  Two separate provisions in the ethical rules for 
lawyers—Model Rules 1.3 and 3.2 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct—presently insist that lawyers must proceed diligently and refrain 
from dilatory tactics in litigation.30  The absence of a similar rule in the 
ABA’s current ethics code for judges is conspicuous and may say less about 
the urgency of the problem than about the apparent intractability of the 
backlog in U.S. courts. 
Delay can harm all categories of litigants, but it is particularly burdensome 
for low-income parties.  When indigent individuals bring claims to obtain 
benefits, housing, education, and medical care, a slow response by the court 
system can cause immense suffering.31  Delay can cause prejudice to low-
income defendants in criminal proceedings, even if it does not rise to the level 
 
 27. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 28. Id. r. 2.5 cmt. 4. 
 29. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS ¶ 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924) (providing that a judge “should be 
prompt in the performance of his judicial duties”); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 
3B(8) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990) (amended 2007) (“A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly . . . .”). 
 30. Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:  “A lawyer 
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF 
PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3.  Model Rule 3.2 provides as follows:  “A lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Id. r. 3.2. 
 31. See Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521, 1554 
(1993) (“Justice delayed can be justice denied in a very real sense, especially for resource-
poor litigants such as injured individuals.”). 
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of requiring dismissal of the charges.32  In the context of petitions for 
postconviction relief, the need for immediate reversal of a wrongful 
conviction is so great that a recent amendment to Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.8 directs prosecutors to act “promptly” when evidence of such an 
error emerges.33  In all categories of cases, courts must make sure that well-
heeled parties do not employ dilatory tactics to exploit the vulnerability of 
low-income parties for whom delay is uniquely onerous.34 
The proposed amendment to Model Rule 2.5 and its commentary could 
help to address the problem of delay in court proceedings.  By elevating the 
issue from commentary to black letter law, the amendment would make clear 
that the prompt processing of cases is among a judge’s core duties.  The 
amended language in the commentary prioritizing certain urgent cases 
involving indigent parties could provide guidance to courts about allocating 
scarce judicial resources to the most time sensitive cases. 
Admittedly, the proposed amendment to address delay as an ethical matter 
would not be as efficacious as a statute setting forth precise time limits for 
disposition of certain civil cases.  Perhaps a speedy trial clock35 for a subset 
of civil claims involving dire health or safety risks might be appropriate.  In 
the context of criminal cases, such legislation has hastened the processing of 
certain cases—at least if the case has progressed to the point at which the 
clock begins.  The general reluctance of legislatures to import protections 
from criminal procedure to any civil setting36 suggests that such a proposal 
would have little hope of success in the near term. 
 
 32. David Siegel, Justice on the Cheap, BOSTON BAR J., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 10, 11 (“Delay 
can render counsel ineffective.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:  
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 27 (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_c
ounsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY6Z-QR8H] (“Aside 
from the potential violations of the right to a speedy trial, these delays disproportionately harm 
poor persons who, because they are unable to post bond, endure repeated delays while they 
remain locked up in jail.”). 
 33. Rule 3.8(g)(1) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 2008, provides:  
“When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable 
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was 
convicted, the prosecutor shall . . . promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or 
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(g)(1). 
 34. Book Note, Karen Jewell, Money and Justice:  Who Owns the Courts?, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1150, 1151 (1985) (reviewing LOIS G. FORER, MONEY AND JUSTICE (1984))  (“Delays in 
hearings, court fees, and costs incurred from missed work, carfare, and child care, often force 
low-income individuals to forgo enforcement of their legal rights or to submit to unsatisfactory 
settlements.”). 
 35. This term refers to a mandatory timetable for disposition of criminal cases, as set forth 
in the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3162, and its state counterparts. 
 36. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 741, 761 (2015) (“[C]ivil Gideon rights have faced regular rejection by courts and 
legislatures.”). 
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IV.  DUTY TO ASSIST PRO SE LITIGANTS AND ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Rule 2.6 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 2.6:  Ensuring the Right to Be Heard; Encouraging and Facilitating 
the Use of Alternate Dispute Resolution 
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a 
proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.  
A judge shall make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court 
rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented 
litigants, to be fairly heard. 
(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to 
settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party 
into settlement.  A judge shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that all 
parties have access to opportunities for alternate dispute resolution 
irrespective of the parties’ resources, socioeconomic status, or ability to 
secure representation by counsel.37  
The proposed amendment to paragraph (A) recognizes the growing 
number of pro se litigants in both the federal and state court systems.38  There 
has been some momentum at the state level to include a similar amendment 
(using the word “may” in the place of “shall”) in Model Rule 2.2,39 but Model 
Rule 2.6(A) seems to be the better place for such language.  After all, Model 
Rule 2.6(A) is about protecting the right to be heard, and the amendment 
would allow the court to help make self-represented litigants heard.40  The 
amendment proposed in this Essay uses mandatory rather than permissive 
language, recognizing that pro se litigants may need help even if judges are 
disinclined to provide it. 
 
 37. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 38. See Cerniglia, supra note 13, at 357. 
 39. One important impetus for this movement was a 2012 resolution of the Conference of 
Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators. CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTS. & 
CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, RESOLUTION 2 IN SUPPORT OF RULE 2.2 OF THE ABA MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO REFERENCE CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTING LITIGANTS 
(July 25, 2012), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/23747/07252012-support-
expanding-rule-aba-model-code-judicial-conduct-self-representing-litigants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4NXG-BGDC].  So far eight states have amended their versions of Model 
Rule 2.2 to allow judicial assistance to pro se litigants. Self-Represented Litigants and the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE CTS. 3–7, https://www.ncsc.org/__ 
data/assets/pdf_file/0030/15798/proselitigantsjan2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ5V-FVB8] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 40. Massachusetts has adopted guidelines listing seven ways in which judges can assist 
pro se litigants:   
(1) construe pleadings liberally; (2) provide brief information about the proceeding 
and evidentiary and foundational requirements; (3) ask neutral questions to elicit or 
clarify information; (4) modify the manner or order of taking evidence or hearing 
argument; (5) attempt to make legal concepts understandable; (6) explain the basis 
for a ruling; and (7) make referrals as appropriate to any resources available to assist 
the litigants.  
Self-Represented Litigants and the Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
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Equal access to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is vital.  Many 
commentators have pointed out that ADR could be particularly valuable to 
low-income parties,41 although some participants at a recent Fordham Law 
Review symposium cautioned against overconfidence in ADR as a guarantee 
of access to justice.42  Among other benefits, the use of ADR to address the 
problems of impecunious clients may reduce expense, save time, respect 
autonomy, and preserve relationships with defendants on whom indigent 
people depend, such as landlords and employees at agencies granting public 
assistance.43  ADR can be especially valuable as a means of resolving 
landlord-tenant disputes, divorces, consumer litigation, tort claims, and civil 
rights suits.44  Judges can help to promote equal access to ADR using at least 
three strategies:  (1) establishing, supervising, and providing adequate 
funding for court-annexed mediation programs; (2) appropriating money 
from court controlled funds in order to pay for outside ADR professionals on 
an ad hoc basis; and (3) serving as mediators themselves to the extent 
permitted under applicable law.45 
V.  DUTY TO MONITOR ATTORNEYS’ COMPETENCE AND CONFLICTS AND 
TO HALT PROSECUTIONS DUE TO INADEQUACY OF RESOURCES 
Rule 2.15 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 2.15:  Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct 
 
 41. See, e.g., Jean-François Roberge et al., Judicial Mediation:  From Debates to 
Renewal, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 613, 613 (2018) (“Judicial mediation involving a 
judge acting as a mediator in a court dispute has been implemented in many jurisdictions 
worldwide as a way to overcome access to justice challenges.”); Larry Spain, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution for the Poor:  Is It an Alternative?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 269, 271 (1994) 
(“ADR does have the potential of increasing access to justice for the poor by providing 
additional forums for the resolution of disputes, particularly when substantially increased 
resources enabling lawyers to represent the poor in traditional litigation do not seem 
probable.”). 
 42. See generally Jaqueline Nolan-Haley, Foreword, Achieving Access to Justice Through 
ADR:  Fact or Fiction?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111 (2020) (summarizing arguments made by 
symposium contributors). 
 43. See, e.g., Lydia Nussbaum, ADR, Dynamic (In)justice, and Achieving Access:  A 
Foreclosure Crisis Case Study, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2337, 2338–43 (2020) (discussing the 
ways in which ADR can achieve more appropriate outcomes for low-income people but also 
noting risks); Tracey S. Wiltgen, Access to Justice Through Mediation, HAW. BAR J., Mar. 
2009, at 22, 22 (explaining the potential value of ADR to low-income litigants). 
 44. See, e.g., BRIAN BIERETZ ET AL., URB. INST. RSCH TO ACTION LAB, GETTING 
LANDLORDS AND TENANTS TO TALK:  THE USE OF MEDIATION IN EVICTION 1 (2020), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101991/getting-landlords-and-tenants-
to-talk_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC4R-GXKE] (stating that “mediation has been an important 
tool for empowering better outcomes” from the perspective of low-income tenants); Judith 
Caprez & Micki Armstrong, A Study of Domestic Mediation Outcomes with Indigent Parents, 
39 FAM. CT. REV. 415, 419–25 (2001) (discussing study results showing that ADR can be 
valuable for low-income parties in family law disputes). 
 45. Comment 1 to Rule 3.9 of the Model Code indicates that judges may engage in 
mediation, either for compensation or on a volunteer basis, if permitted to do so by applicable 
law. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.9 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
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(A) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a 
violation of this Code that raises a substantial question regarding the 
judge’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects shall 
inform the appropriate authority. 
(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question 
regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.  A judge who 
determines that a criminal defense attorney in a pending case is incapable 
of performing competently or is subject to a conflict of interest for any 
reason, including a heavy caseload, shall not allow the prosecution to 
proceed until such time as the problem is remedied and the defendant can 
obtain adequate representation. 
(C) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood 
that another judge has committed a violation of this Code shall take 
appropriate action. 
(D) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood 
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct shall take appropriate action.46 
Many public defenders work in offices with crushing caseloads.47  Such a 
lawyer may be unable to devote more than a small amount of time to a 
particular case.  This constraint could prevent the lawyer from meeting the 
ethical duty of competence, which requires “thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”48  The heavy caseload also 
could create a conflict of interest if it presents a “significant risk of material 
limitation” on the lawyer’s ability to represent a particular defendant.49 
The proposed amendment to Rule 2.15 of the Model Code would highlight 
the importance of the judge’s role in screening attorneys’ competence and 
conflicts at the outset of criminal prosecutions.  A judge could question a 
criminal defense attorney at the initial appearance to assess whether any 
circumstances, including overall caseload, might hinder the attorney’s 
 
 46. Id. r. 2.15. 
 47. See generally Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Regulating Mass Prosecution, 53 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1175, 1181 (2020) (discussing “frustrations about the high caseloads that increasingly 
burden an ever-diminishing number of public defenders”). 
 48. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see Oritseweyinmi 
Joe, supra note 47, at 1202–05 (explaining that excessive caseloads can compromise “a public 
defender’s ability to comply with the profession’s duty to provide competent representation 
to every client”). 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (setting forth tests for conflicts); JOHN 
BOURDEAU ET AL., 19A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law:  Rights of the Accused § 183 (2020) (“A 
conflict of interest is inevitably created when a public defender is compelled by an excessive 
caseload to choose between the rights of the various indigent defendants being represented.”); 
TRACY FARRELL ET AL., 14A FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law—Procedure § 572 (2020) (noting that 
courts in Florida recognize the need for disqualification due to excessive caseload); 
Oritseweyinmi Joe, supra note 47, at 1202–05 (explaining how public defenders’ caseloads 
create conflicts). 
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performance.50  At this juncture, the judge would assess any limitation by 
applying the ethics rules, rather than the relatively low standards for effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.51  By contrast, if the 
inquiry into the attorney’s competence or conflicts first occurs after the 
defendant’s conviction, the defendant faces a greater challenge to show 
deficient performance by counsel and the defendant would need to show that 
the errors actually affected the result52—a difficult task necessitating 
speculation about counterfactual scenarios. 
Under the amended version of Model Rule 2.15, disqualification of entire 
offices could halt prosecutions on a large scale.  This strict enforcement of 
lawyering standards using the ethical rules prospectively—rather than 
applying the relatively weak constitutional standards retrospectively53—
could galvanize legislatures to increase funding for indigent defense.54 
VI.  DUTY TO CONSIDER LITIGANTS’ ABILITY TO PAY FINES, FEES, AND 
BAIL 
Canon 2 of the Model Code should be amended to include the following 
new rule: 
Rule 2.17:  Considering Ability to Pay Fines, Fees, and Bail 
(A) A judge shall undertake a meaningful inquiry into a litigant’s ability to 
pay court fines, fees, restitution, other charges, bail, or civil debt before 
using incarceration as a punishment for failure to pay, as inducement to 
pay or appear, or as a method of purging a financial obligation whenever 
state or federal law so provides. 
(B) A judge shall not set, impose, or collect legal financial obligations 
under circumstances that give the judge an improper incentive either to 
multiply legal financial obligations or to fail to inquire into a litigant’s 
ability to pay.  
The language of this amendment derives from ABA Formal Opinion 490, 
issued on March 24, 2020.55  This well-reasoned opinion explained the 
hardship endured by low-income litigants, who may find it impossible to pay 
 
 50. The judge already does this to screen for possible conflicts arising from multiple 
representations with respect to the same case or indictment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(C). 
 51. E.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483–91 (1978) (holding that, prior to 
conviction, an actual conflict is sufficient to necessitate appointment of new counsel). 
 52. E.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166–74 (2002) (holding that, for a claim of 
conflict first raised after conviction, reversal requires that an actual conflict adversely affected 
representation); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–49 (1980) (holding that when a 
defendant first raises a conflict issue after conviction, the defendant must demonstrate an 
actual conflict adversely affected the representation). 
 53. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect:  Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics 
Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1188–89 (2003) (noting that constitutional standards for 
effective assistance of counsel are lower than standards set forth in ethical rules). 
 54. I saw this occur in Oregon when underfunding of indigent defense services stopped 
several categories of felony prosecutions in 2003 and the legislature immediately restored 
funding.  In Florida, by contrast, the legislature passed a law forbidding disqualification based 
on low funding for indigent defense. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 49, § 572. 
 55. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020). 
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fines, fees, bail, and other charges but who are nonetheless subject to possible 
incarceration.56  The opinion also discussed the unseemly spectacle that some 
courts and municipal governments obtain substantial revenue from the 
collection of fines issued under threat of incarceration.57 
While the conclusion of the opinion is commendable, the forum for this 
guidance is not ideal.  A principle so important deserves its own ethics rule 
in the Model Code.  States tend to adopt the black letter provisions that appear 
in the Model Code.58  These provisions then become binding at the state 
level.  By contrast, an ABA ethics opinion has no direct force at the state 
level and is at best persuasive authority.59  The authors of the opinion based 
it on very general rules that permit many different interpretations and states 
have not interpreted these general rules the same way.  A more specific rule 
in the ABA template would seem appropriate to ensure widespread adoption 
of the reforms discussed in Formal Opinion 490. 
VII.  DUTY TO CONDUCT REMOTE PROCEEDINGS FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY 
Canon 2 of the Model Code should be amended to include the following 
new rule: 
Rule 2.18:  Conducting Remote Proceedings Fairly and Equitably 
(A) To the extent that a judge allows remote appearances in any 
proceeding, the judge shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that 
counsel, parties, and witnesses have access to technology enabling full and 
complete participation. 
(B) A judge shall endeavor to minimize material disparities in the nature 
and quality of technology used by counsel, parties, and witnesses to 
participate in remote proceedings. 
(C) When a represented party or witness is not in the same location as the 
attorney for that party or witness during a remote proceeding, the judge 
 
 56. Id. (“There is evidence that judges in some jurisdictions have repeatedly failed to 
inquire into litigants’ ability to pay financial obligations prior to incarceration for 
nonpayment.”).  Yale Law School’s Arthur Liman Center for Public Interest Law hosted a 
series of colloquia examining the great hardship that fines and fees create for low-income 
Americans. See The Liman Center’s Colloquium 2018:  Who Pays?:  Fines, Fees, Bail, and 
the Cost of Courts, YALE L. SCH. (June 1, 2008), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/liman-
centers-colloquium-2018-who-pays-fines-fees-bail-and-cost-courts [https://perma.cc/6SC2-
QK8Y]. 
 57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490, at 2, 4, 8. 
 58. Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say:  The 
Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 325 (1996) 
(indicating that “most states’ ethics rules are derived from an ABA-promulgated document,” 
such as the Model Code of Judicial Conduct). 
 59. Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal Ethics Opinions, 22 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 973, 988 (1997) (noting that the persuasive authority of ABA opinions is 
inconsistent at the state level and this fact limits the practical impact of ABA opinions); 
Kirsten Schimpff, Rule 3.8, the Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created a Conflict Between 
Ethics and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1758–59 (2012) 
(“ABA ethics opinions do not have the force of law and are not binding upon the states in 
interpreting their own ethics rules.”). 
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will provide opportunities for attorney-client consultation, and the judge 
will take measures to safeguard the confidentiality of attorney-client 
communication. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, courts have greatly reduced the number 
of in-person hearings and trials.  Remote proceedings are becoming 
common.60  Courts are conducting hearings, and even trials, through the use 
of remote conferencing technology.  Sometimes participants join these 
proceedings using videoconferencing platforms, such as Zoom, and 
sometimes participants join by phone.61  Commentators have suggested that 
remote proceedings may continue even after the COVID-19 pandemic 
subsides62 because these proceedings reduce costs, promote safety, and 
enable participation by witnesses who might not otherwise be able to travel 
for a live appearance. 
Remote proceedings present risks for low-income litigants in both criminal 
and civil cases.  Many such parties lack access to computers with stable 
internet connections.63  If an indigent person uses conspicuously worse 
videoconferencing technology than other participants in a remote proceeding 
or if the indigent person is the only one to use a phone, this disparity could 
cause prejudice in the eyes of the fact finder.64  The low-income litigant using 
inferior technology might also be at a disadvantage perceiving visual cues 
and discerning what others are saying.65  In a criminal case, an indigent 
pretrial detainee will not likely be in the same room as the defense attorney 
during remote appearances, and the difficulty of communicating with counsel 
during the proceeding could diminish the effectiveness of representation. 
 
 60. SLS L. & Pol’y Lab, COVID-19 and the Effect of Video Technology on Indigent 
Defense Services (807U), STANFORD L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/education/only-at-
sls/law-policy-lab/practicums-2020-2021/covid-19-and-the-effect-of-video-technology-on-
indigent-defense-services-807u [https://perma.cc/9DT6-BPNA] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
(“As a result of COVID-19, most jurisdictions in the country rapidly moved court and court-
related communications from in-person to audio- and video-conferencing.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. E.g., Lauren Gibbons, Virtual Court Hearings Could Continue Past Pandemic, but 
Questions of Constitutionality Arise, MLIVE MICH. (July 14, 2020), https://www.mlive.com/ 
public-interest/2020/07/virtual-court-hearings-could-continue-past-pandemic-but-questions-
of-connectivity-constitution-arise.html [https://perma.cc/2YUR-Y2PQ] (quoting statements 
by Chief Justice Bridget McCormack of the Michigan Supreme Court). 
 63. SLS L. & Pol’y Lab, supra note 60 (“Providers of indigent defense services have 
identified concerns associated with . . . the ability of clients to access reliable technology.”). 
 64. Lauren Kirchner, How Fair Is Zoom Justice?, THE MARKUP (June 9, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://themarkup.org/coronavirus/2020/06/09/how-fair-is-zoom-justice [https://perma.cc/ 
UC4K-KNUJ] (discussing the dehumanizing effect of technology used for remote 
appearances, especially to the extent that “[p]eople seem less like people” to the fact finder); 
see, e.g., MacArthur Just. Ctr., Video Bond Hearings:  Cook County Ends Unconstitutional 
TV Bond Hearings, NW. PRITZKER SCH. OF L. (Nov. 17, 2006), https://www.law.northwestern. 
edu/legalclinic/macarthur/projects/indigent/videobond.html [https://perma.cc/3NHC-CSK5] 
(reporting results of a study showing that video bond hearings produced harsh results by 
comparison to in-person hearings). 
 65. Kirchner, supra note 64 (“Of course, people can always call into video conferences 
with a regular telephone line, but not being able to see what’s going on puts them at a 
significant disadvantage, compared with others who have the full audiovisual experience.”). 
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The proposed amendment to the Model Code would create an ethical duty 
for the judge to level the playing field as much as possible in remote 
proceedings.  The judge would need to make sure that all counsel, parties, 
and witnesses have the means to participate.  The court system could 
facilitate such access by setting up private videoconferencing rooms at 
locations near communities where few people have access to 
videoconferencing technology (examples of appropriate locations for these 
rooms might include a public library near low-income housing or a medical 
clinic serving a Native American community).  Court administrators should 
also purchase basic computers, tablets, or comparable devices that would be 
available to lend as needed.66  When it is not possible to ensure that all 
participants in a remote proceeding have access to the same level of 
technology, a judge might decide that the lowest common denominator (e.g., 
phone conferencing) would be the best means of communication.  In any 
event, the judge would need to provide ample opportunities for consultation 
between attorney and client when the two cannot be in the same location 
during a remote proceeding. 
VIII.  DUTY TO AVOID MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS THAT 
DISCRIMINATE BASED ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Rule 3.6 of the Model Code should be amended so that it reads as follows: 
Rule 3.6:  Affiliation with Discriminatory Organizations 
(A) A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices 
invidious discrimination on the basis of any basis, including race, sex, 
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, or 
socioeconomic status. 
(B) As used in paragraph (A), the term “invidious discrimination” applies 
not only to discrimination in selecting the organization’s members but also 
to discrimination in conducting the organization’s activities and in 
pursuing the organization’s goals. 
(B) (C) A judge shall not use the benefits or facilities of an organization if 
the judge knows or should know that the organization practices invidious 
discrimination on one or more of the bases identified in paragraph (A).  A 
judge’s attendance at an event in a facility of an organization that the judge 
is not permitted to join is not a violation of this Rule when the judge’s 
 
 66. Purchasing this technology would indeed be a significant undertaking but it would not 
be unprecedented:  schools have been acquiring such technology in bulk to facilitate remote 
learning during the pandemic. See David Rauf, Coronavirus Squeezes Supply of 
Chromebooks, iPads, and Other Digital Learning Devices, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.edweek.org/education-industry/coronavirus-squeezes-supply-of-chromebooks-
ipads-and-other-digital-learning-devices/2020/04 [https://perma.cc/ZB5R-3PP2] (reporting 
that school districts nationwide scrambled to acquire tablets and laptops for remote instruction 
during the COVID-19 pandemic).  There is a risk that borrowers may attempt to abscond with 
the devices, but that risk should not be exaggerated.  Court officials will have detailed 
information about the borrowers, which should help to deter theft.  The devices can also be 
traced via GPS. 
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attendance is an isolated event that could not reasonably be perceived as an 
endorsement of the organization’s practices.67 
The current version of Model Rule 3.6(A) is too short.  In listing the 
categories of organizational discrimination that are off-limits for a judge, 
Model Rule 3.6(A) deviates significantly from the list that appears in Model 
Rule 2.3 (governing judges’ official statements and conduct).68  This 
mismatch has been a problem for three decades.  Beginning in 1990, the 
Model Code prohibited judges from expressing bias in an official capacity 
concerning socioeconomic status,69 but the code has never forbidden judges 
from joining organizations that discriminate invidiously on the basis of 
socioeconomic status.70  A better approach would be to harmonize the lists 
in Model Rules 2.3 and 3.6 so that judges operate within approximately the 
same boundaries at all times.  To put it differently, a judge who indulges bias 
from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. will have difficulty eschewing bias from 9:00 
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
The ABA has previously recognized the danger caused by asymmetry 
between the lists in Model Rules 2.3 and 3.6.  Indeed, the ABA previously 
decided to close this gap in the context of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  The 1990 version of the Model Code forbade official statements 
evincing bias with respect to sexual orientation but allowed judges to hold 
membership in organizations that discriminate invidiously on the basis of 
sexual orientation.71  The ABA decided in 2007 to forbid judges’ 
involvement in discrimination based on sexual orientation at any time—
whether in connection with official duties or in connection with membership 
in private organizations.72  The apparent reason for the 2007 amendment was 
the ABA’s realization that a judge’s official statements of tolerance seem 
disingenuous when they are inconsistent with the judge’s off-the-bench 
activities.73  The time has come to extend the same principled and consistent 
approach to discrimination based on socioeconomic status. 
 
 67. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 68. Id. r. 2.3. 
 69. Canon 3B(5) in the 1990 Model Code provided, in pertinent part, as follows:  “A judge 
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, 
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status . . . .” MODEL CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990) (amended 2007). 
 70. Canon 2C of the 1990 Model Code provided as follows:  “A judge shall not hold 
membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion or national origin.” Id. Canon 1C.  Perhaps one could argue that membership in 
discriminatory groups not covered by Canon 2C would violate more general provisions 
exhorting judges to avoid conduct unbefitting their stations, but under the time-honored 
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a list that prohibits some specific things seems 
to permit those alternatives not listed. 
 71. Id. Canon 3B(5). 
 72. Since 2007, Model Rule 3.6(A) has explicitly listed sexual orientation as an 
impermissible ground for discrimination.  For a side-by-side comparison of the relevant 
language in the 1990 Model Code and the 2007 Model Code, see AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 
22. 
 73. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (“A judge’s public manifestation of 
approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives rise to the appearance of impropriety 
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The proposed amendment to Model Rule 3.6 would expand its coverage in 
many ways beyond merely lengthening the list of impermissible bases for 
discrimination.  The amendment includes language prohibiting any invidious 
discrimination, so that the enumerated grounds are illustrative rather than 
exhaustive.  The amendment classifies an organization’s discrimination as 
“invidious” based not only on membership restrictions (the primary criterion 
mentioned in the current rule’s commentary) but also based on the 
organization’s activities and goals.  After all, an organization open to all that 
pursues discriminatory objectives is every bit as invidious in the public’s 
eyes as is an organization that merely discriminates in admitting members. 
The ABA’s enlightened approach to sexual orientation in 2007 drew 
objections based on judges’ associational freedoms, and such objections 
would foreseeably arise in response to this Essay’s proposal as well.  Several 
responses are possible.  First, the amendment proposed in this Essay would 
only apply to organizational discrimination that is invidious, and the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence accords scant protection to invidious 
discrimination.74  Second, it is worth noting that three states have added the 
term “socioeconomic status” to their versions of Model Rule 3.6 and have 
not thereby violated any federal or state constitutional provisions.75  Third, 
the notion of a “right” to join a group that discriminates against the 
impecunious seems even less compelling than the objections raised by 
opponents of the 2007 amendment concerning sexual orientation.  At least 
the critics in 2007 could cite concerns about their association with churches 
and the military, but neither type of organization systematically discriminates 
against low-income people (indeed, they seem to show more interest in 
people with limited means than Model Rule 3.6 presently does).  Finally, the 
best way to address concerns about the overbreadth of the term 
“socioeconomic status” in the amended version of Model Rule 3.6 would be 
 
and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  A judge’s 
membership in an organization that practices invidious discrimination creates the perception 
that the judge’s impartiality is impaired.”); cf. AM. BAR ASS’N JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE 
THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, REPORT NOVEMBER 2006 (2006), http://www.bjs.state. 
mn.us/file/code-of-judicial-conduct/aba-joint-comm-report-nov-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L9FR-TME2] (explaining generally the rationale for the ABA’s revision of Model Rule 3.6 
in 2007). 
 74. E.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1988) 
(upholding, over challenges based on First Amendment associational freedoms, a New York 
City ordinance prohibiting invidious discrimination by private clubs). 
 75. HAW. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 3.6 (“A judge shall not hold membership in any 
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, gender 
identity, gender expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or personal characteristics.”); N.M. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT R. 21-306 (“A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that 
practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, 
ethnicity, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, spousal affiliation, 
socioeconomic status, political affiliation, age, physical or mental handicap, or serious medical 
condition.”); VT. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (“A judge shall not hold membership in 
any organization that, in the selection of members, practices invidious discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, religion, or national origin.”). 
2021] JUDGES’ ETHICAL DUTIES 1255 
to discuss exemptions in the commentary,76 just as the authors of the 2007 
amendment did when they added commentary specifying that affiliation with 
churches or the military would not be problematic.77 
Some examples might help to illustrate the scope of the proposed 
amendment.  A judge would be able to live in a neighborhood that is 
unaffordable for low-income families, but a judge would not be able to join 
an organization that lobbies for new zoning regulations forbidding low-
income housing in neighborhoods with an average home value exceeding 
$300,000.  A judge would be able to join a country club that admits any 
applicant capable of paying the $10,000 annual membership fee, but a judge 
would not be able to join a social club that excludes applicants raised in 
single-parent households.  A judge could join a homeowners’ association, 
but a judge could not join an organization that excludes homeless people and 
that endeavors to drive homeless people out of the local area. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no panacea for the legal challenges facing low-income Americans.  
These challenges result from a confluence of factors, including structural 
poverty and unfair laws.  From time to time, impecunious people encounter 
problems for which the legal system provides a remedy, but even then, the 
odds are stacked against the potential claimants.  Surveys consistently show 
that low-income individuals do not have legal assistance in approximately 80 
percent of the cases in which they could potentially raise a civil claim.78  In 
the context of criminal prosecutions, the indigent have a right to an attorney 
when charged with a felony,79 but the caseloads carried by appointed counsel 
are so great that this representation is not always effective.80  In sum, the 
legal system offers little hope to the low-income litigant. 
A judge is in a unique position to help.  Judges have discretion to adapt 
procedural and evidentiary rules as necessary to achieve fairness.  Rules of 
judicial ethics guide the use of that discretion.  This Essay has proposed eight 
amendments to the Model Code that might make a small difference in 
promoting fairness for low-income litigants.  Significant progress must await 
 
 76. The commentary could mention that discriminatory groups might be exempt from the 
prohibition to the extent that they are private, small in scale, and engage in constitutionally 
protected activities in which a judge would be entitled to participate but for the new language 
of Model Rule 3.6.  The commentary could provide a few examples of such clubs and contrast 
them with clubs that are probably subject to the prohibition in the new version of Model Rule 
3.6. 
 77. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmts. 4–5 (clarifying that judges’ affiliations 
with churches and the military remains permissible, notwithstanding the 2007 amendment). 
 78. Professor Deborah Rhode of Stanford Law School reported on the aggregate data:  
“For decades, bar studies have consistently estimated that more than four-fifths of the 
individual legal needs of the poor and a majority of the needs of middle-income Americans 
remain unmet.” Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice:  An Agenda for Legal Education and 
Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 531 (2013). 
 79. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (extending the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to any state noncapital felony prosecution). 
 80. See supra notes 47–49. 
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monumental reforms, such as a “civil Gideon” or major increases in funding 
for indigent defense services in criminal cases.  Until that time, however, any 
proposal for incremental reform deserves consideration.  If we cannot 
provide low-income litigants with the resources they need to have equal 
footing in court, we should at least update the Model Code so that judges are 
more attentive to these litigants’ unique hardships.81 
 
 81. As several commentators pointed out during this Colloquium, another important step 
that requires near-term attention is the collection of data regarding the experience of low-
income litigants in judicial proceedings, especially pro se litigants.  The most valuable data 
for present purposes would contrast the experiences of litigants in jurisdictions that have 
reformed judicial ethics to those that have retained the traditional approach. 
